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Abstract: In this paper we use multilevel discrete-time recurrent hazard analysis to 
simultaneously model the impact of life cycle events and structural processes on 
poverty entry and exit across European Regions. Research questions are, (i) what is 
the importance of life cycle events on the road to entry into and exit from poverty, (ii) 
are there any differences in poverty dynamics between European Regions and if so, 
how can we explain these differences. The analysis is based on individual and 
household panel data of the European Community Household Panel linked with a 
regional time series database. Main findings are that men’s poverty dynamics is 
dominated by employment-related events, while for women demographic events also 
play a role. Regional structural factors only have a slight or no influence on poverty 
transitions, but the welfare regime turns out to be highly significant for poverty entry. 
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The awareness that life cycle events are crucial to poverty dates back to the path-
breaking study of worker’s poverty by Rowntree (1901). Contrary to common-sense 
knowledge at the time, he discovered that their poverty was not inescapable, but re-
lated to specific life cycle phases such as one's own childhood, having dependent 
children and old age. 
 
Ever since, dramatic changes in advanced industrial societies have occurred: the life 
course has been individualised (Mayer, 1997), the labour market has undergone im-
portant changes (Schmid, 1998) and the welfare state has expanded considerably 
(Goodin et al., 1999). As a result, in many countries, the kind of life-cycle poverty 
identified by Rowntree has flattened out, but large cross-national differences remain 
(Kangas and Palme, 2000).  
 
Are we witnessing the beginning of the end of poverty life cycles in advanced indus-
trialised countries? What is the impact of life-cycle events such as marrying or divorc-
ing on falling in or moving out of poverty? In addition, what is the importance of struc-
tural factors such as welfare regimes or welfare growth? 
 
Our aim is to unravel the relative importance of key institutional arrangements in ex-
plaining poverty dynamics: labour market, marriage market, welfare state and macro-
economic conditions in a general cross-national context. Labour market and marriage 
market are viewed to operate at the individual level, while welfare state and macro-
economic conditions operate at the structural level. 
 
To answer these questions, we further elaborate the comparative analysis of poverty 
dynamics by integrating recent advances in comparative research methods such as 
multilevel modelling and by including the European Regions as an intermediate level 
of determinants. 
 
We link eight years (1994-2001) of individual and household panel data of ten coun-
tries of the European Community Household Panel (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom) with regional time 
series of the REGIO database, both provided by Eurostat, and estimate multilevel 
discrete-time recurrent hazard rate models of (re)entry into and (re)exit from poverty.  
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We find that the impact of individual changes on poverty transitions is most impor-
tant. While employment related changes are important for women and (even more) 
for men, demographic events are only important for women. The impact of regional 
structural factors is more limited. But the welfare regime and regional gross domestic 
product growth turn out to be important factors for poverty entry and women’s poverty 
exit respectively.   
 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next Section, we review important individual 
and structural perspectives on poverty and state our research hypotheses. In Section 
three we describe the data used and some important concepts. The method of analy-
sis, multilevel recurrent hazard analysis, is explained in Section four. The fifth Section 
presents the results of our analysis and discusses them. The final Section summa-
rises the results. 
 
 
2 Poverty  Perspectives 
 
2.1   A Changing Life Course 
 
The study of family or life cycle changes (for example, leaving the parental home, 
getting married, having a child, divorcing, becoming widowed…) and the outcomes of 
such changes on poverty are important issues in social demography. The individual 
life course then is defined as a particular sequence of such changes.  
 
During the last 50 years or so, this life course has been subject to profound changes 
such as the emergence of cohabitation, the postponement (and more often ultimately 
the cancel) of children, the growing instability of marriage... In addition, new family-
types such as dual-earner couples and single households have become more wide-
spread.  
 
Concurrently, important shifts have occurred at the labour market. In the educational 
sphere, we have witnessed prolonged educational careers and sex equalisation. La-
bour market entries are delayed, women's labour market participation has increased 




At the same time, an important expansion and subsequently a restructuring of the 
welfare state took place, thereby redistributing the outcomes of the market. Conse-
quently, more people are secured to live decently irrespective of their position in the 
labour market. 
 
Research on the driving forces behind these changes refer to changes in values or 
norms, in industrial relations, in economy, in historical institutional macro-
configurations, in implicit contracts in society (Mayer, 1997) but also to political inter-
vention and welfare state arrangements (Leisering and Leibfried, 1999). 
 
 
2.2   Poverty Perspectives 
 
In reviewing theories that are used to explain poverty, McKernan and Ratcliffe (2002) 
conclude that the literature lacks a widely accepted general theory of poverty. In-
stead, many different perspectives on the causes of poverty have been put forward. 
Iceland (2003) classifies them as either individual or structural.  
 
 
2.2.1. Individual  Poverty  Perspectives 
 
In the so-called individual perspective, the poor themselves create their poverty. Indi-
vidualistic explanations for poverty refer to characteristics such as indolence, lack of 
intelligence and other negative personality traits, as well as to family or community 
characteristics such as inadequate parenting and lowered aspirations reproduced by 
disadvantaged families and communities (Alcock, 1997). Important predominantly 
individualistic perspectives are the life cycle hypothesis, the individualisation thesis, 
the persistence hypothesis and human capital theory. We briefly discuss these theo-
ries below. 
 
According to the life cycle hypothesis, poverty risks are modulated by demographic 
changes across the individual life cycle. This approach of poverty goes back to 
Rowntree’s classical study of poverty in the city of York (1901). Rowntree's major 
discovery was that workers typically were not poor during their whole life, but only 
during specific phases of their family life: when they were children themselves, when 
they had dependent children and during retirement. Poverty could then be explained  
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by referring to increased family needs or reduced earning power or inadequate pen-
sions.  
 
The individualisation thesis (Berger, 1994) puts forward that nowadays, individual 
biographies have become much more open and diverse and are increasingly de-
pendent on individual decisions. Classical causes of poverty (labour market, family, 
welfare regimes) no longer dominate. Instead subjective competences become more 
important. 
 
Central to the persistence hypothesis is that consequences of poverty also reinforce 
the causes of its persistence. For instance, living in poor neighbourhoods results in a 
subculture of poverty, which is transferred from one generation to the other by so-
cialisation processes in the family (Lewis, 1966).  
 
A central thesis in human capital theory is that people who invest in their education or 
skills can expect higher income (Becker, 1975). This theory also predicts that young 
adults and the elderly are expected to have lower wages. Other important factors are: 
the number of children in the household, health status and gender. A high number of 
children or a bad health status reduces the number of hours worked and therefore 
has a negative effect on income. Because of their discrimination in the labour market, 
women have a lower wage rate and thus are expected to have lower incomes. 
 
Some major findings from the individualistic perspective are that both family and la-
bour market events are important. Union and employment are positive events, 
whereas separation and unemployment have an adverse effect (Duncan et al., 
1993). Empirical results also point to gender differences (Bourreau-Dubois, 2003). 
Men’s vulnerability to poverty is linked more to labour market events, whereas 
women’s poverty risk is largely due to their dependence on their partner’s income. 
 
At the individual level, we expect that marriage and employment will decrease the 
likelihood of poverty entry and increase the likelihood of poverty exit, while divorce 
and unemployment will have opposite effects (Hypothesis 1). Further, due to de-
pendence on their partner’s income, the impact of demographic events will be more 
pronounced for women compared to men (Hypothesis 2). 
 
 
2.2.2. Structural  Poverty  Perspectives  
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From a structural perspective, it is argued that individual models often overlook the 
impact of economic, social and political systems on poverty (Iceland, 2003). Key 
structural processes are economic growth and economic inequality. While economic 
growth determines the size of the pie, inequality affects the size of the slices. In a 
world of finite resources, different social strata will have different poverty levels. Pov-
erty should be seen as the outcome of the functioning of a capitalist labour market. 
To combat such poverty, in modern welfare states, various antipoverty policies have 
been developed and implemented. But then, if poverty persists how effective have 
such policies been?  
 
The market system, through economic growth, fosters overall standards of living. On 
the other hand, changes in the structure of the economy can also have a negative 
effect. For instance, the skills mismatch hypothesis (Kasarda, 1990), based on evi-
dence from inequality in wages by level of education, puts forward that declining de-
mand for workers at the lower end of the economic ladder compared to available 
supply has contributed to inequality. Important explanations for this hypothesis are 
deindustrialisation (Iceland, 1997a) and technological change (Danziger and 
Gottschalk, 1995). Deindustrialisation has disproportionately replaced higher-wage 
manual skill jobs by highly polarised service sector jobs. Technological change has 
raised the demand for highly skilled workers relative to those with lower skills.    
 
We derive from the skills mismatch hypothesis, that de-industrialised (Hypothesis 3a) 
or technologically advanced regions (Hypothesis 3b) will exhibit increased poverty 
entry rates and decreased poverty exit rates. 
 
Policy systems and market institutions in European Union (EU) countries might have 
a different impact on poverty. Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) distinguishes four types 
of welfare state regimes. Each type shares a relatively similar set of social policy 
goals. Major differences are with respect to the relative role of state and market and 
the level and design of welfare benefits. In the social-democratic regime (e.g., Den-
mark), emphasis is laid on the role of the state and on safeguarding equality. Welfare 
benefits are universal and not means-tested. In the liberal welfare regime (e.g., 
United Kingdom), an important role is assigned to the market. Benefits are means-
tested and reserved for the truly needy only. In the conservative countries (e.g., 
Germany), next to state and market, corporate bodies such as the church, the family 
and classes also play a role. Here, welfare provisions are more generous compared  
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to the liberal states. In the southern countries (e.g., Greece), public policy assumes 
that households carry the principal responsibility and benefits are low and selective.  
 
While welfare regime theory has been relatively successful in explaining cross-
sectional poverty, this is far less the case for poverty dynamics. Deriving hypothesis 
about poverty dynamics proves to be a difficult exercise (Fouarge and Layte, 2003).  
In previous work by Layte and Whelan on the impact of welfare regimes on poverty 
persistence (2003), it was found that social welfare and market incomes play different 
roles in poverty transitions.  
 
In line with these findings by Layte and Whelan (2003), we have derived two compet-
ing hypothesis for welfare regime theory and poverty dynamics. If poverty transitions 
are dominated by income changes other than changes in labour income then the 
southern welfare regime should show the highest poverty dynamics, compared to the 
liberal type, and especially the conservative and social-democratic types (Hypothesis 
4a). On the other hand, if poverty transitions are dominated by labour earning dy-
namics, then the ranking of welfare regime types is the opposite, with the social-
democratic type being the most dynamic (Hypothesis 4b).  
 
 
2.2.3. Multilevel  Perspectives 
 
Much of the poverty research is single country and predominantly individualistic ori-
ented (e.g., Canada: Finnie, 2000; Sweden: Fritzell and Henz, 2001; Spain: Canto, 
2003; United Kingdom: Jenkins et al., 2001; United States: Mc Kernan and Ratcliffe, 
2002). Structural determinants, if any, are often introduced as control factors. The 
reversed research design, i.e. structural determinants as the primary focus controlled 
for by individual variables is far less common (e.g., McCulloch, 2001). 
  
Multi-country poverty studies often rely on separate regressions (e.g., Muffels et al., 
1999; Oxley et al., 2000; Jenkins & Schluter, 2003) or analysis of covariance (e.g., 
Fouarge and Layte, 2003). Such research strategies are not very well suited for the 
inclusion of structural factors such as welfare state arrangements (e.g., type of wel-
fare benefits, level of welfare benefits, …) and macro-economic conditions (e.g., 
economic growth, skills mismatch,…). For example, in analysis of covariance country 
level variables are confounded and in separate regressions, structural factors simply  
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cannot be included. In this paper, by introducing multilevel models, the problem of 





In this paper, we have linked two cross-national longitudinal EU databases: the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP: Eurostat, 1996) and the REGIO do-
main of New Cronos (REGIO: Eurostat, 2002a). ECHP is a harmonised cross-
national longitudinal survey covering the living conditions of private households and 
individuals (income, poverty, employment status, housing, healthcare, and educa-
tion…). REGIO contains aggregate time-series for the European Regions of the prin-
cipal aspects of the economic and social life: demography, economic accounts, edu-
cation, labour force, health, unemployment…  
 
We use ECHP data from 1994 to 2001 for ten EU member States (Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and the United King-
dom). In most countries, the harmonised ECHP questionnaire was used. For some 
countries (United Kingdom and Germany) ECHP data are derived from national data 
surveys.   
 
In the first wave of the ECHP (1994) a sample of some 60,500 households was ran-
domly selected. Response rates vary largely among countries: from a low under 50 
% for Germany to a high of 85-90% in a number of southern countries (e.g.; Greece, 
Italy and Portugal). Although attrition rates are high in several countries, fears that 
attrition has undermined the representativeness of the ECHP samples are largely 
unfounded (Watson, 2003). Weights are available, taking into account the sample 
design and characteristics of persons and households. These weights are calibrated 
to reflect the structure of the population (Eurostat, 2001). Nevertheless, even in the 
absence of compensating attrition weights, attrition has only a minor impact on pov-
erty rates (Watson, 2003). 
 
In sum, the ECHP is a highly harmonised and comparable dataset across countries. 
This has been achieved through the implementation of common procedures at all 
surveys. Residual country heterogeneity will be taken into account by the introduction 
of random effects in a pooled analysis.  
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In REGIO, regions are classified according to NUTS (Nomenclature of Statistical Ter-
ritorial Units), a hierarchical classification with three regional levels. Due to confiden-
tiality constraints in ECHP, linking ECHP
2 and REGIO is restricted to NUTS level 1, 
i.e. the top-level of the NUTS classification. Some NUTS 1 regions (e.g., in Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany
3, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom
4) follow boundaries 
of existing administrative units, others (e.g., in France
5, Greece, Italy and Spain) are 
compiled by grouping together existing smaller administrative units. Average size of 
NUTS 1 regions is between 3 and 7 millions. Table 1 shows the number of NUTS 1 
regions by country, as well as the corresponding sample sizes.  
 
(Table 1, about here) 
 
The working sample consists of 27102 individuals  i , aged 16 and over in NUTS 1 
regions that are present in each yearly ECHP wave from 1994 to 2001. Stratified 
simple random sampling has been used to restrict the working sample to one house-
hold member per household. Such a restriction eliminates dependencies be-
tween observations coming from the same household. Ignoring such depend-
encies would lead to grossly overestimated variances at the regional level 
(Moerbeek, 2004). 
 
The outcome variable of interest is individual change in poverty status from one year 
to another. Poverty entry is a change from non-poor to poor and poverty exit is the 
opposite transition, from poor to non-poor. A person may become poor or non-poor 
several times. In ECHP 94-01, for a given person, at most four poverty entries(exits) 
can be observed. A first poverty entry(exit) cannot be observed before 1995, the 
second ECHP wave. A poverty re-entry(re-exit), if any, cannot be observed before 
1997. A period between two poverty entries(exits) is called a spell. First observed 
events are preceded by left-truncated spells, i.e. spells for which the onset occurred 
before 1994 and is unknown. On the other hand for most last observed spells in 2001 
no information about the duration of the event is available, i.e. they are right-
censored. Data for wave 1994 and for the year immediately after an event are ex-
cluded from the analysis of that type of event. 
                                                 
2 To link ECHP and REGIO, we have converted region codes in ECHP (in NUTS-95 format) to RE-
GIO region codes  (in NUTS-99 format) by means of a NUTS conversion scheme (Eurostat, 2002b: 74-
95). 
3 Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland, representing ca. 5% of the German population, could not be included 
due to differences in region coding between ECHP (NUTS-95) and REGIO (NUTS-99). 
4 Northern Ireland is not included in the BHPS version of ECHP.  
5 Départements D’Outremer is not included in ECHP.  
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To assess the poverty status of a person in a specific year, household equivalised 
individual income 
P I  is compared with a relative poverty threshold  R, below(above) 
which a person is considered poor(non-poor). Following official EU guidelines, for a 
given calendar year and country, poverty thresholds  R are set at 60% of the median 
equivalised income per capita. For person i  at wave t =1994,...,2001 equivalised 
individual income 
P
it I  is derived from an income-to-needs ratio: household income  
H
it I over equivalised household size 
H










= . (1) 
 
The total net monetary annual household income 
H
it I , is the sum of all monetary in-
come sources k  (including income from work, private income and net social trans-
fers, i.e. benefits less taxes) of all household members aged 16 or more and refers 
principally to the year prior to the survey. Equivalised household size 
H
it S  is calcu-
lated according to the modified OECD scale. This scale assigns a weight of 1.0 to the 
first person of the household, 0.5 to each subsequent person aged 14 or more, and 
0.3 to each person under 14.  
 
Note that we are not taking household equivalised income as dependent variable, 
since we want to measure income relative to incomes in the same country. One 
measure of relative household income, although quite crude, is the binary poverty 
measure defined above. This measure is also used by policy makers within Europe. 
 
To test for Hypothesis 1, four time-varying change indicators at the individual level 
are introduced Marriage (change from never married to married), Divorce (change 
from married to separated or divorced), Employment (change from unemployed to 
employed) and Unemployment (change from employed to unemployed). Note that 
employed and unemployed are derived from self-defined main activity status. Em-
ployed refers to normally working more than 15 hours. Hypothesis 2 is put to a test 
by estimating separately similar models for men and women and comparing the coef-
ficients. For these change indicators and key poverty measures, overall rates (1995-
2001) by country are presented in Table 2.  
 
(Table 2 about here) 
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For hypothesis 3a and 3b, we use two regional variables, Service Sector and Re-
search and Development respectively. Service sector measures regional service sec-
tor employment rate in 1997 (as a percentage of the employment in all NACE 
branches relative to Denmark), while Research and Development is time-varying and 
represents regional R&D employment rate in the business enterprise sector (as per-
centage of the labour force relative to Denmark).  
 
Structural hypotheses 4a and 4b are tested by including the time-invariant regional 
covariate,  Welfare Regime, a four-level categorical variable representing Esping-
Andersen’s extended typology of welfare state regimes. The four levels are Social 
Democratic (Denmark), Conservative (Belgium, France and Germany), Liberal (Ire-
land and the United Kingdom) and Southern (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
 
A set of control variables measured at the individual level will be added to the model. 
Education is a time-constant covariate referring to the situation in 1994 with three-
categories (less than secondary, secondary level and third level). Time-varying con-
trol variables at the individual level are, Age (16-40, 41-50, 51-60, 60+) Civil status 
(married, separated or divorced, widowed, never married), Cohabiting status (no, 
yes), Activity status (inactive, unemployed, employed) and Health status (“very bad 
and bad” versus “fair to very good”). Household differences are controlled for by 
Household Type (single without children, single with children, couple without children, 
couple with children and other).  
 
Control variables at the regional level are: employment rate,  unemployment rate, 
relative gdp and gdp growth. Employment rate is the percentage of the working popu-
lation in relation to the total population. Unemployment rate
6 is the percentage unem-
ployed persons in the total economically active population. Relative gdp
7 is ex-
pressed in Purchasing Power Standard per inhabitant as percentage of the EU15 av-
erage. Gdp growth is taken as gdp in log differences. All regional control variables, 
except gdp growth are expressed in terms of deviation from Denmark. Regional con-
trol variables are time-varying, except Employment rate, which is only available for 
1997. 
 
                                                 
6 We have imputed data for 1994-’95 in UK Regions North East, North West, East of England, South 
East  and for 1994-’97 in London, based on national data. 
7 Regional GDP data in REGIO are calculated in accordance to the rules of the European system of 
integrated economic accounts (ESA95). We have imputed wave 1 data on the basis of ESA78 data.  
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Finally, there is the variable Duration, measuring for each type of spell (i.e., first, sec-
ond, third and fourth spell) separately duration of non-occurrence of the event of in-
terest relative to onset of risk as a time-varying covariate (in years). In Duration time-
scales for first, second, third and fourth spell are combined in a single categorical 
variable with 16 levels (7 levels for first spell and 5, 3, 1 levels for respectively sec-
ond, third and fourth spell). For the first spell, onset of risk is unknown and duration is 
coded as  j −  for a first event occurring in the year 2001 j − . So events observed in, 
for example, 1995, have value -7 for the duration variable. Duration for subsequent 
spells is measured as time elapsed since the previous event of that type minus two. 
This specification of the Duration variable has the advantage to allow for different es-
timates of the baseline hazard for both types of spells, and to control for left-
truncation (see Section 4.2). Finally, to control for dependencies between multiple 




4 Method  of  Analysis 
 
4.1  Discrete-Time Hazard Modelling 
 
Individual income in the ECHP is defined and measured at a yearly scale. Thus, pov-
erty entries and exits can only be calculated to occur from one yearly survey to an-
other. Clearly, continuous-time survival models, relying on the assumption of time 
being a continuous random variable are inappropriate here and it is necessary to ap-
ply discrete-time analysis methods. A well-known and frequently used discrete-time 
model is the discrete logit model (Cox, 1972; Allison, 1982; Singer and Willet, 1993). 
 
Let a sample consist of n independent individuals  1,..., in =  with corresponding event 
times  i T , relative to a known common start time  0 t = , and assumed to be i.i.d. non-
negative discrete random variables. At the event time  i T  individual  i  transfers from 
the non-poverty to the poverty status (poverty entry). In a second analysis, the event 
to be studied is a transition from poverty to non-poverty status (poverty exit). Then, 
the discrete-time hazard rate  it p is defined as the conditional probability that a person 
i experiences an event at discrete time t , given the event has not already occurred 
to that individual before t : 
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  Pr( | ) it i t i p TTt = = ≥ . (2) 
 
This hazard rate can be specified to depend on time t and a vector of possibly time-
varying explanatory variables  it x  by means of a logistic regression specification: 
 
  1/[1 exp( )]. it t it p x α β = +− −  (3) 
 
We can reformulate (3) to yield the discrete logit model: 
  
  log( /(1 )) . it it t it p px α β − =+  (4) 
 
In this model, the  t α  form a set of t  intercepts, one for each value of the duration 
variable. Together they form the baseline hazard. 
 
We are unaware of software for directly fitting the discrete-time hazard model. A well-
known workaround is based on the mathematical equivalence of the log-likelihood of 
the discrete-time logit model to the log-likelihood of person-time indicators of event 
occurrence (Allison, 1982). Thus, in practice, model (4) can be estimated by using 
any maximum likelihood based logistic regression program. Estimation methods rely 
on the standard assumption of non-informative right-censoring.  
 
 
4.2  Discrete-time Recurrent Hazard Modelling 
 
In ECHP 94-01, a single individual may experience up to four (non-)poverty spells. 
The case of multiple spells can be modelled by the class of recurrent hazard models 
(Allison, 1982; Willett and Singer, 1995; Kelly and Lim, 2000). In discrete time, we 
now have  1, 2,3, 4 k =   random variables  ik T  representing the time at which the 
th k event occurs to individual i . The onset of risk for event k  is defined as the first 
time point after occurrence of event  1 k −  where a transition of status can take place. 
Hence we use the gap time formulation (Kelly and Lim, 2000), where  the occurrence 
of event k  is modelled on a time scale relative to the occurrence to the prior event 
and not relative to the actual time of observation. The discrete-time hazard rate for 




  11 1 [|] it i i p PT t T t = =≥  (5) 
and 
  (1 ) (1 ) [|, ] . ikt ik ik i k i k pP T t T t T t −− ==≥ =  (6) 
 
The next step is to specify, in analogy to (4), how the logit transformed hazard de-
pends on time and explanatory variables: 
 
  log( /(1 )) ikt ikt t ikt p px α β − =+  (7) 
 
for  1,..., in = ,  1, 2,3, 4 k =  and t  takes on all possible values of the duration variable for 
the 
th k  spell.  
 
The baseline hazard in model (7) is taken differently for the 
th k event . Note that a 
large number of spells are left-truncated, complicating the estimation procedure 
(Hamerle, 1991; Guo, 1993; Stevens, 2000). Since omitting the left-truncated cases 
would lead to serious selection bias in poverty studies (Iceland, 1997b), we have kept 
them in the analysis. Due to the specification of the duration variable, separate base-
line hazards are estimated for left-truncated (i.e., first) and subsequent spells, hereby 
controlling for left-truncation and allowing for event specificity of the baseline hazard. 
 
 
4.3 Multilevel  Discrete-Time  Recurrent Hazard Modelling 
 
Our comparative analysis of poverty dynamics is based on a multilevel extension of 
the discrete-time recurrent hazard regression model (7). Our data belong to two dif-
ferent levels of a hierarchy: individuals nested within regions. A natural way to ana-
lyse such a hierarchical data structure is to use contextual regression models. Con-
textual regression models integrate variables at several levels of a hierarchy in one 
analysis. Kreft and de Leeuw (1998) notice three different approaches in contextual 
regression modelling: traditional non-hierarchical extensions (e.g., separate regres-
sions), classical contextual models (e.g., analysis of covariance) and modern multi-
level models (random components). 
Traditionally, in non-hierarchical models, the nested nature of the data has been ig-
nored completely. In classical contextual models and in modern multilevel models, 
individual and regional variables can be introduced simultaneously. These methods 
adequately can split the variation into a between individual level and a within regional  
  15
level, but each in their own way. Classical contextual models let the intercept and/or 
the coefficients vary in a fixed way, while modern multilevel models allow the inter-
cept and/or the coefficients to vary randomly. 
 
We prefer to model the nesting of individuals i  within regions r  in the random effects 
tradition. Random effects will be denoted in bold. The set of intercepts  rt α  are now  
random variables, assumed to follow a normal distribution (Bryk and Raudenbush, 
2002; Goldstein, 2003 and Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Model (7) for the logit trans-
formed hazard rate for event k  of individual i  belonging to region r  becomes  ac-
cordingly: 
 
  log( /(1 )) irkt irkt rt irkt p px β − =+ α . (8) 
 
The intercept in (8) can be split into a fixed part and an unknown region-specific ran-
dom deviation: 
 
  0 rt t r α = + α u . (9) 
 
The random deviations  0r u  have intercept variance  0² σ . This  variance  0² σ  is an ex-
tra parameter to be estimated. If it is significantly different from zero, then we can say 
that regional effects are present. 
 
In this paper, we use three reduced versions of (8), a null random model (A), a ran-
dom intercept model (B) and an extended random intercept model (C). The null ran-
dom intercept model A is given by:  
 
  log( /(1 )) irkt irkt t 0r pp α − =+ u , (10) 
 
where  t α  is now the expected value for the baseline hazard and  0r u
 
the random de-
viation from this expectation for region r. This model does not consider explanatory 
variables. It provides an estimate for the expected baseline hazard and the regional 
level variance  0² σ  . 
 
Let us divide the vector of covariates  irkt x  in a first part containing only the individual 
specific (or level one) variables 
1




irkt x . In the random intercept model B, only individual level explanatory vari-




0 log( /(1 )) ( ) irkt irkt t r irkt p px αβ −= + + u . (11) 
 
This model contains three types of parameters: the intercepts αt , the individual re-
gression coefficients 
1 β , and regional level intercept variance  0² σ . If the latter vari-
ance is zero, then the regional level is not relevant. Then we could drop the random 
deviation term  0r u  in (11) and arrive at model (7), with fixed effects only. 
 
The random intercept model (11) can be further extended by introducing the regional 




0 log( /(1 )) ( ) irkt irkt t r irkt rkt p px x αβ β −= + ++ u . (12) 
 
If the intercept variation among regions shrinks to zero, then it is said that the re-
gional level variables capture the regional variation and there is no significant re-
gional heterogeneity left. 
 
 
5 Results   
 
In Tables 3 to 6, we present results for modelling the probability of becoming poor 
(poverty entry) and the probability of escaping poverty (poverty exit) for men and 
women separately. The tables contain estimates for the three models discussed in 
the previous Section. Models A include the main effect of Duration. Models B also 
include the main effects of individual level covariates, while models C in addition in-
clude the main effects of regional covariates. All models incorporate a random inter-
cept for region. 
 
The models yield estimates for three types of parameters: α ’s,  β ’s and the intercept 
variance  0² σ . The collection of α ’s provides an estimate of the baseline hazard and 
they will be expressed as probabilities. They can be interpreted as the probability to 
enter (exit) poverty for the baseline group. In model A, the corresponding baseline 
group is the entire sample, while in models B and C this baseline group corresponds  
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to a reference group. The β ’s assess the effects of covariates on the probabilities of 
poverty entry (exit) and are expressed as odds ratios. As the possibility of reversed 
causation cannot completely be ruled out, one should be cautious in interpreting 
these coefficients as strict causal effects. The estimate for the intercept variance  0² σ  
measures the amount of unexplained variance at the regional level.  Significance of 
model parameters will be tested for by likelihood ratio tests.   
 
We first describe results for the individual level variables. The presentation starts by 
discussing female entry, followed by male entry, female exit, male exit and a com-
parison by gender. We then discuss in a second subsection the results for the differ-
ent covariates at the regional level.  
 
 
5.1 Individual  Level 
 
In Table 3, the results for women’s poverty entry are presented. From the null model 
(A) one observes that every year about 7% of the women being in their first spell of 
non-poverty will enter poverty. For those being already in their second spell this 
probability further increases to about 12%.  Adding individual covariates results in 
model (B), nested in model (C). The estimated coefficients in (B) are close to those of 
(C), indicating robustness of the estimation procedure. 
 
For women, divorce is the event which has the strongest effect on the probability of 
becoming poor. Women who divorce have odds of becoming poor about 5 times 
higher as women who not divorce. A marriage significantly reduces the risk of be-
coming poor, as expected.  
 
Becoming employed, quite surprisingly, increases the odds for women of becoming 
poor by 56%. Finally, becoming unemployed seems to increase the odds of becom-
ing poor, but the effect found is not statistically significant. We see two possible ex-
planations for this unexpected effect of employment. First, part of the new jobs may 
be part-time and/or low-paid and therefore might insufficiently replace eventual loss 
of social benefits. Second, women may already anticipate their future income position 
by getting a job before they actually become poor. For example, women who are in 
the process of divorcing may already get a job before they actually divorce. 
 
(Table 3, about here)  
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Let us quickly describe the effect of the control variables on female poverty entry. 
Compared to young age and low education, older age and higher education de-
crease the odds of becoming poor significantly.  Activity status is also important: 
compared to inactive women, being at work reduces the odds of women’s poverty 
entry, while being unemployed increases entry risk. Finally, poverty entry risks are 
also modulated by household type. Living in a couple nearly halves entry risk com-
pared to living as a single, irrespective of the presence of children. Civil status, co-
habiting status and - surprisingly - health status seem to have no impact at all. The 
absence of any noticeable effect of health status might be related to cross-national 
comparability issues in relation to the health-scale used.  
 
The results for men’s poverty entry are presented in Table 4. For men, the most im-
portant individual event associated with poverty entry is unemployment. Unemploy-
ment raises the odds of becoming poor by 61%. Becoming employed, again quite 
surprisingly, increases the odds for men of becoming poor by 47%. The other thwo 
events all seem to slightly increase the odds for men’s poverty entry. But, these find-
ings are not statistically significant. 
 
(Table 4, about here) 
 
We restrict the presentation of the effect of men’s control covariates to a comparison 
with the effects found for women. In general, significance, direction and even effect 
size are quite similar. Though, in contrast to the female results, we now also notice a 
significant effect for cohabiting men and men in good health. 
 
We now turn to the results for female poverty exit, reported in Table 5. A marriage 
almost doubles the risk of poverty exit, while a divorce more than halves the risk of 
women’s poverty exit. Economic events also show, as expected, opposite effects: 
whereas employment increases the odds of poverty exit by 168%, unemployment 
seems to decrease the odds of poverty exit. However, the latter effect is not statisti-
cally significant. 
(Table 5, about here) 
 
We again compare control covariate effects with the results for female poverty entry.  
Opposed to female poverty entry, Civil status, Cohabiting status and single house-
hold with children now also have an effect.   
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Finally, in Table 6, the results for men’s poverty exit are shown. Marriage has no sig-
nificant effect, while divorce seems to increase men’s poverty exit, but this effect is 
also not significant. The impact of men’s economic changes is more pronounced. 
Finding a job increases the odds of poverty exit by 350%; whereas losing a job 
seems to decrease the odds of poverty exit by 17%. 
 
(Table 6, about here) 
 
Compared with women’s results for poverty exit, men’s control covariates again show 
many similarities. An important difference however is that for male exit, age does not 
seems to be important. 
 
We conclude the presentation of the effect of individual covariates by comparing the 
effect of the life cycle events on poverty entry and exit across gender. The estimates 
of the β ’s are expressed as log odds ratios to make numerical comparison between 
positive and negative effects easier. From Table 7, we can derive that marriage and 
divorce have an opposite impact on women’s poverty dynamics. As to poverty entry, 
divorce has a strong increasing effect while marriage decreases the likelihood of be-
coming poor. For poverty exit, this pattern is reversed. Divorce now has a decreasing 
and marriage an increasing effect. For men however, demographic events seem to 
be of little or no importance.  
 
(Table 7, about here) 
 
Part of this sex-specific pattern can be explained by the relatively low income position 
of women. In income terms, marriage then means a gain for women, but a loss for 
men. The opposite is true for divorce, in income terms a loss for women but a gain 
for men. The larger impact of divorce can be explained by changing needs due to the 
presence of children. Divorcing usually means that children stay in the mother’s 
household. Consequently, on top of income losses, divorcing women face a larger 
proportion of the burden of household needs. Overall, these findings confirm hy-
pothesis 2. 
 
We now compare poverty consequences of employment and unemployment transi-
tions. From Table 7, we derive that the employment and unemployment event have 
opposite effects on poverty exit: while finding a job increases the likelihood of poverty  
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exit, unemployment has the reversed effect. On the other hand, for poverty entry un-
employment increases the likelihood of poverty entering. Moreover, also employ-
ment–especially for women- seems to increase the likelihood of entering poverty. As 
already mentioned this result for employment might be explained as an anticipation 
of the negative consequences of events like a future divorce. Compared to unem-
ployment, employment effects have a greater impact on poverty exit, both for men 
and women. As to gender differences, except for employment in relation to poverty 
entry, the effects of becoming unemployed and employed are strongest for men. We 
may conclude that hypothesis 1 is confirmed. Furthermore, the impact of demo-
graphic events (marriage/divorce) is more important for women, while economic 
events (becoming employed/unemployed) are more pertinent for men. 
 
The greater impact of employment over unemployment on poverty exit may be ex-
plained by the fact that income gains related to employment on average exceed in-
come losses associated with unemployment. This can be easily understood as un-
employment allowances are generally lower before a change from unemployment to 
employment as after a change from employment to unemployment.  Explanations for 
gender differentials may be related to labour income differentials by gender due to 
overrepresentation of women in low-paid and part-time jobs. 
 
 
5.2 Regional  Level 
 
First of all note that the regional intercept variances are relatively small, but all sig-
nificant for all considered models.  Hence, even after introducing regional level expli-
cative variables, there is still a significant part of the unexplained variance due to the 
regional differences which is being picked up by the random effects. Now what are 
the effects of the regional covariates?  
 
 
Research and development seems to increase the likelihood of poverty entry and to 
decrease the likelihood of poverty exit, as expected by hypothesis 3a. These results 
could support the hypothesis that technological change contributes to inequality in 
Europe, but the effects are not statistically significant. For service sector and the as-
sociated deindustrialisation version of the skills mismatch hypothesis (hypothesis 3b), 
no support is present in the data. However, such findings should be handled with  
  21
caution, as the indicators we were able to construct were only remote proxies for the 
concepts of deindustrialisation and technological change.  
 
Welfare regime has an impact on the likelihood of poverty entry but not on the likeli-
hood of poverty exit. In the conservative and the southern type, the probability of be-
coming poor is only about half the risk of becoming poor in the liberal and social-
democratic regimes. In countries of these types there are less poverty dynamics. 
These findings confirm neither hypothesis 4a nor hypothesis 4b. Such results point to 
a weakness inherent to using broad classifications of countries such as Esping-
Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes. This typology is based on a mix of several 
underlying dimensions, such that if any effects are found, they tend to be theoretically 
ambiguous.  
 
As to the control covariates, regional employment rate and relative gdp have a weak 
to insignificant negative effect on poverty dynamics. Gdp growth tends to decrease 






In this paper, we have contributed to the literature of poverty dynamics by explicitly 
adding a structural dimension to the predominantly individually oriented study field of 
poverty entry and exit. To facilitate an integrated approach of individual and structural 
dimensions we have enriched individual ECHP panel data with regional time series 
for 63 European regions. Our analysis method took advantage of multilevel tech-
niques especially suited for the analysis of such mixed-level data. 
 
The results of the individually oriented hypothesis largely confirm what was expected. 
For marriage and divorce a sex-specific pattern was found. While marriage and di-
vorce have a strong, but opposite impact on poverty dynamics for women, these 
events are of little of no importance for men. The effects for employment and unem-
ployment were found to be stronger for men.  Evidence for the structurally oriented 
hypothesis was less convincing. Welfare regimes have an impact on poverty entry, 
but this was not detected for poverty exit. No decisive evidence was found for the 
skills mismatch hypothesis.  
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A limitation of the present study is that the number of time periods for which data 
were available is rather limited, making it difficult to find significant drivers of poverty 
dynamics. The proposed methodology, a multilevel discrete-time recurrent hazard 
analysis, will be even more appropriate when applying it to individual panel data and 
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Table 1. Number of Regions and Sample Size by Country 
 
Country Region  Sample  Size 
Belgium  3 1635
Denmark  1 1445
France  8 3401
Germany  14 3428
Greece  4 2867
Ireland  1 1115
Italy  11 3683
Portugal  3 3073
Spain  7 3274
United Kingdom  11 3181
Total  63 27102
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Table 2. Key dependent and independent variables by Country (overall rates, 1995-
2001). 
 








Belgium  14.02 4.85 4.64 0.48 0.59 0.86 0.87
Denmark  11.54 4.84 4.24 1.59 0.63 1.93 1.73
France  14.24 4.71 4.70 0.73 0.47 1.31 1.23
Germany  10.05 3.53 4.10 0.80 0.66 1.86 2.28
Greece  24.44 6.81 7.20 0.60 0.16 1.26 0.99
Ireland  26.80 6.70 5.88 0.61 0.27 1.27 0.94
Italy  17.02 6.02 6.52 0.82 0.27 1.25 0.80
Portugal  24.92 5.66 5.94 0.86 0.41 1.11 1.03
Spain  18.27 7.00 6.60 0.76 0.28 2.12 1.72
United Kingdom  19.10 5.80 5.75 0.79 0.95 0.84 0.71
Total  17.79 5.57 5.65 0.79 0.47 1.39 1.25
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Table 3.  Female Poverty Entry in 63 European Regions (1994-2001). Estimation 
Results for a Discrete-Time Recurrent Hazard Model with Random Effects and No 
Covariates (A), only Individual Level Covariates (B) and the Multilevel Model (C)  
 
    MODEL A  MODEL B  MODEL C 
                Coef
† p             Coef
† p             Coef
† p 
SPELL             
 Duration  First spell, -7  0.067 0.221  0.256 
   First spell, -6  0.064 0.218  0.252 
   First spell, -5  0.064 0.216  0.257 
  First spell, -4  0.059 0.206  0.247 
  First spell, -3  0.049 0.171  0.201 
  First spell, -2  0.045 0.161  0.187 
  First spell, -1  0.052 0.190  0.216 
  Sec. spell, 0  0.115 0.314  0.386 
  Sec. spell, 1  0.133 0.371  0.453 
  Sec. spell, 2  0.135 0.386  0.465 
  Sec. spell, 3  0.115 0.330  0.393 
  Sec. spell, 4  0.132 0.384  0.449 
  Third spell, 0  0.128 0.332  0.393 
  Third spell, 1  0.144 0.385  0.451 
   Third spell, 2  0.149 0.410  0.476 
   Fourth spell, 0  0.126 0.431  0.533 
PERSON                    
   Marriage  Yes        0.636*   0.633*  
   Divorce  Yes        5.403***  5.397*** 
   Employment  Yes        1.560**  1.560*** 
   Unemployment  Yes        1.065  1.074 
   Education  Secondary    0.630***  0.634*** 
Low (Ref)  High        0.338***  0.342*** 
   Age  41-50    0.805***  0.807*** 
16-40 (Ref)  51-60    0.703***  0.706*** 
   60+        0.596***  0.600*** 
   Civil status  Never Married    0.842*  0.848* 
Married (Ref ) Divorced/separated    0.962  0.973 
   Widowed        0.833*   0.838 * 
   Cohabiting status  Yes        0.960   1.050  
   Activity status  Working    0.461***  0.464*** 
Inactive (Ref) Unemployed        1.327***  1.329*** 
   Health status  Good        0.951   0.951  
   Household Type  Couple with child    0.500***  0.495*** 
Single, no child (Ref) Couple, no child    0,532***  0,529*** 
   Other    0.641***  0.634*** 
   Single, with child        0.942   0.936  
REGION                    
   Welfare regime  Conservative        0.454*** 
     Social-dem (Ref) Liberal        0.696 
   Southern              0.411*** 
   Service sector                 1.000  
   Research & Devel.                 1.042  
   Employment rate                 0.967*** 
   Unemployment rate                 0.972***  
   Gdp, relative                 0.994*** 
   Gdp, growth                 0.885  
VARIANCE(Intercept)     0.048***  0.037 ***  0.021*** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; 
† duration in probability scale, other covariates in odds-ratio’s  
  
  29
Table 4.  Male Poverty Entry in 63 European Regions (1994-2001). Estimation Re-
sults for a Discrete-Time Recurrent Hazard Model with Random Effects and No Co-
variates (A), only Individual Level Covariates (B) and the Multilevel Model (C) 
    MODEL A  MODEL B  MODEL C 
                Coef
† p             Coef
†  P             Coef
† p 
SPELL           
 Duration  First spell, -7  0.056 0.173  0.200 
   First spell, -6  0.053 0.167  0.191 
   First spell, -5  0.049 0.158  0.183 
   First spell, -4  0.047 0.150  0.177 
  First spell, -3  0.037 0.119  0.139 
  First spell, -2  0.038 0.127  0.148 
  First spell, -1  0.033 0.110  0.128 
  Sec. spell, 0  0.127 0.317  0.374 
  Sec. spell, 1  0.132 0.339  0.400 
  Sec. spell, 2  0.138 0.367  0.431 
  Sec. spell, 3  0.117 0.315  0.369 
  Sec. spell, 4  0.074 0.199  0.234 
  Third spell, 0  0.098 0.236  0.278 
  Third spell, 1  0.152 0.393  0.462 
   Third spell, 2  0.155 0.419  0.494 
   Fourth spell, 0  0.381 1.067  1.244 
PERSON                    
   Marriage  Yes        1.244   1.239  
   Divorce  Yes        1.055   1.046  
   Employment  Yes        1.471***  1.463***  
   Unemployment  Yes        1.608***  1.619*** 
   Education  Secondary     0.610***  0.617*** 
Low (Ref) High        0.322***  0.327*** 
   Age  41-50     0.917  0.918 
16-40 (Ref) 51-60     0.824***  0.826*** 
   60+        0.797***  0.795*** 
   Civil status  Never Married     0.880  0.888 
Married (Ref) Divorced/separated     0.807  0.820 
   Widowed        0.671***  0.675** 
   Cohabiting status  Yes        1.273*  1.291* 
   Activity status  Working     0.600***  0.600*** 
Inactive (Ref) Unemployed        1.579***  1.569*** 
   Health  Good        0.828***   0.833 *** 
   Household Type  Couple with child     0.611***  0.600*** 
Single, no child (Ref) Couple, no child     0.488***  0.484*** 
   Other     0.703***  0.692*** 
   Single, with child        0.748**  0.739*** 
REGION                    
   Welfare regime  Conservative         0.447*** 
     Social-democr. (Ref) Liberal         0.634* 
   Southern              0.426*** 
   Service sector                 0.998  
   Research & Devel.                 1.156  
   Employment rate                 0.974*** 
   Unemployment rate                 0.992  
   Gdp, relative                 0.993*** 
   Gdp, growth                 1.110  
VARIANCE(Intercept)     0.098 ***  0.063***  0.023*** 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; 
† duration in probability scale, other covariates  in odds-ratio’s  
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Table 5. Female Poverty Exit in 63 European Regions (1994-2001). Estimation Re-
sults for a Discrete-Time Recurrent Hazard Model with Random Effects and No Co-
variates (A), only Individual Level Covariates (B) and the Multilevel Model (C) 
    MODEL A  MODEL B  MODEL C 
                Coef
† p             Coef
† P             Coef
† P 
SPELL           
   Duration  First spell, -7  0.076 0.116 0.110
   First spell, -6  0.078 0.120 0.111
   First spell, -5  0.065 0.102 0.096
   First spell, -4  0.057 0.091 0.087
   First spell, -3  0.052 0.084 0.078
   First spell, -2  0.043 0.070 0.066
  First spell, -1  0.040 0.067 0.063
  Sec. spell, 0  0.094 0.126 0.120
  Sec. spell, 1  0.114 0.155 0.148
  Sec. spell, 2  0.104 0.143 0.135
  Sec. spell, 3  0.089 0.124 0.118
  Sec. spell, 4  0.070 0.101 0.096
  Third spell, 0  0.111 0.147 0.139
  Third spell, 1  0.110 0.151 0.144
  Third spell, 2  0.111 0.153 0.144
  Fourth spell, 0  0.168 0.221 0.210
PERSON               
   Marriage  Yes     1.979 *** 1.977 ***
   Divorce  Yes     0.470 *** 0.469 ***
   Employment  Yes     2.680 *** 2.683 ***
   Unemployment  Yes     0.794   0.798  
   Education  Secondary  0.657 *** 0.661 ***
Low (Ref) High     0.347 *** 0.348 ***
   Age  41-50  0.872 ** 0.875 **
16-40 (Ref) 51-60  0.753 *** 0.755 ***
   60+     0.661 *** 0.663 ***
   Civil status  Never Married  1.341 *** 1.349 ***
Married (Ref) Divorced/separated  1.797 *** 1.808 ***
   Widowed     1.346 *** 1.352 ***
   Cohabiting status  Yes     1.311 *** 1.317 ***
   Activity status  Working  0.567 *** 0.570 ***
Inactive (Ref) Unemployed     1.131   1.130  
   Health status  Good     0.917 *  0.917 * 
   Household Type  Couple with child  0.859 * 0.854 *
Single, no child (Ref) Couple, no child  0.769 *** 0.766 ***
   Other  1.035 1.029
   Single, with child     1.238 *** 1.232 ***
REGION              
   Welfare regime  Conservative  0.749
     Social-democr. (Ref) Liberal  0.879
   Southern        0.650  
   Service sector           1.003  
   Research & Devel.           0.887  
   Employment rate           0.987
   Unemployment rate           0.985 * 
   Gdp, relative           0.993 *** 
   Gdp, growth           2.925 *
VARIANCE(Intercept)     0.060 *** 0.052  *** 0.021 ***
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; 
† duration in probability scale, other covariates  in odds-ratio’s   
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Table 6. Male Poverty Exit in 63 European Regions (1994-2001). Estimation Results 
for a Discrete-Time Recurrent Hazard Model with Random Effects and No Covariates 
(A), only Individual Level Covariates (B) and the Multilevel Model (C) 
    MODEL A  MODEL B  MODEL C 
                Coef
† p             Coef
† p             Coef
† P 
SPELL            
 Duration  First spell, -7  0.063 0.108  0.101
   First spell, -6  0.061 0.105  0.096
   First spell, -5  0.052 0.091  0.083
  First spell, -4  0.046 0.081  0.076
  First spell, -3  0.042 0.075  0.069
  First spell, -2  0.031 0.057  0.053
   First spell, -1  0.033 0.063  0.059
   Sec. spell, 0  0.115 0.171  0.156
  Sec. spell, 1  0.142 0.211  0.193
  Sec. spell, 2  0.105 0.161  0.147
  Sec. spell, 3  0.110 0.171  0.158
  Sec. spell, 4  0.056 0.088  0.082
  Third spell, 0  0.103 0.151  0.139
  Third spell, 1  0.134 0.205  0.190
  Third spell, 2  0.102 0.173  0.162
   Fourth spell, 0  0.169 0.192  0.183
PERSON                 
   Marriage  Yes     1.077    1.072  
   Divorce  Yes     1.587   1.587
   Employment  Yes     4.536 ***  4.516 ***
   Unemployment  Yes     0.820   0.824
   Education  Secondary  0.616 ***  0.624 ***
Low (Ref) High     0.347 ***  0.355 ***
   Age  41-50  0.873 **  0.873 **
16-40 (Ref) 51-60  0.876   0.877 *
 60+     0.820 **   0.815  **
   Civil status  Never Married  1.308 **  1.331 **
Married (Ref) Divorced/separated  1.099   1.126
   Widowed     0.983   0.997  
   Cohabiting status  Yes     1.457 ***  1.490 ***
   Activity status  Working  0.640 ***  0.640 ***
Inactive (Ref) Unemployed     1.367 ***  1.359 ***
   Health status  Good     0.872 **  0.874 **
   Household Type  Couple with child  0.867   0.848 *
Single, no child (Ref) Couple, no child  0.655 ***  0.649 ***
   Other  1.093   1.068
   Single, with child     0.972    0.957  
REGION                
   Welfare regime  Conservative    0.686
     Social-democr. (Ref) Liberal    0.797
   Southern          0.618 * 
   Service sector             0.997  
   Research & Devel.             0.914  
   Employment rate             0.984 * 
   Unemployment rate             1.004  
   Gdp, relative             0.996 *
   Gdp, growth             1.964  
VARIANCE(Intercept)     0.074 *** 0.061 ***  0.020 ***
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001; 




Table 7. Effect of Life Cycle Events on Poverty Entry and Poverty Exit by Gender in 
63 European Regions (1994-2001) 
 
        Entry           Exit     
      Women    Men      Women    Men   
      Β
† p Β
† p  Β
† p Β
† p 
   Marriage     -0.458*   0.214   0.682***  0.069  
   Divorce     1.686*** 0.045  -0.756*** 0.462 
   Employment     0.445*** 0.381***  0.987*** 1.508*** 
   Unemployment     0.071 0.482***  -0.226    -0.193 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001, 
†  coefficients expressed on a logit scale 
 
 
 
  